
















	The central problem in traditional philosophy of mind is the so-called mind-body problem.  To a first approximation, the problem is to answer the following question:

What is the exact nature of the relationship between, on the one hand, someone’s mental (or psychological) condition at a given time and, on the other hand, the person’s neurophysiological condition at that time?

For example, what is the exact nature of the relationship between your having a visual experience with a certain introspectible character right now and your being in whatever exact neurophysiological state you are in fact in right now?  What is the exact nature of the relationship between your understanding right now what you are reading and your being in whatever exact neurophysiological state you are in fact in right now?

	Certain features of how the question above has just been formulated are inessential.  The formulation above speaks of mental and neurophysiological conditions and states, but a parallel question could equally well be asked about mental and neurophysiological processes.  The formulation above speaks of people, i.e., human bearers of mental states, but the question applies equally to whatever non-human (e.g., chimpanzee) bearers of mental states there might be.  The formulation above implies that the only kind of material state that might be relevant to determining a person’s mental state at a given time is a neurophysiological state of that person at the same time; but there are philosophical views concerning the representational content of mental states which imply that what mental state someone is in at a given time is determined not merely by the simultaneous neurophysiological state that the person is in but also by the physical environment that the person is in, and indeed by the history of his or her interaction with his or her physical environment.

	The  formulation above assumes that mental states exist, i.e., that people really are in mental states.  But not all philosophers of mind accept this assumption.  Some of those who do not—the so-called eliminative materialists—hold that mental states are merely the posits of a folk theory of behavior that is radically false, and hence that mental states no more exist than do the medieval humors.  Others of them—the so-called instrumentalists—hold that the human practice of attributing mental states to one another is merely a fiction that serves us very well in predicting human behavior.  In this article, however, it will be assumed that mental states exist.

	To state the question that expresses the mind-body problem, it is not necessary to define the words “mental” and “material” (or “physical”).  If pressed to say what we mean by “mental states”, we can reply simply by listing examples of mental states: thinking that lunch is at noon, wanting to visit Paris, feeling pain, feeling jealousy, seeming to see a patch of blue, and so forth.  If pressed to say what we mean by “material states”, we can reply by giving examples of uncontroversially material states: neurophysiological states, neurophysiologically-implemented computational states,  physico-chemical states, and so on.  It might be valuable to know necessary and sufficient conditions for a state to count as mental, but we do not need to know this in order to understand or to address the mind-body problem.













	Let us call the first way the type-identity way.  Your being in pain at time t is related to your being in material (e.g., neurophysiological) state M at t if, and only if, the following condition is met:

 pain = M.

Philosophers often call a kind of state a type of state, or state-type.  In this jargon, the condition can be expressed by saying that pain is the very same state-type as M.  The sameness in question is not exact similarity, a relation that typically holds between two entities; it is the relation of being the very same thing as, a relation that can only hold between one thing and itself (the one thing might have two names, of course).  If pain is the very same state-type as M, then it is not even logically possible for a creature to be in pain without being in M, or to be in M without being in pain.  Hence your being in M at t logically entails your being in pain at t, and conversely.  After all, if pain = M, there is only one state-type at issue, even though we may refer to it by using either of the two expressions, “pain” and “M”.  An important corollary is that someone who claims that pain = M is not denying the existence of pain.  On the contrary, someone who claims that pain = M (and who accepts that M exists) cannot deny that pain exists, for a state that does not exist can hardly be one and the same as a state that does exist.  As noted above, there are philosophers who deny the existence of such things as pains and other mental states; but those who assert the identity of mental state-types with material state-types are not among them.  To be a materialist it is not necessary to be an eliminative materialist.

	Such claims as that pain = M are not intended as, and should not be interpreted as, claims whose truth or falsity can be evaluated by a priori reflection on the meanings of the words “pain” and “M”.  They should be understood on the model of such scientific identity claims as that being alcohol = being C2H5OH, having tuberculosis = being infected with Mycobacterium tuberculosis, being at such-and-such temperature = having so-and-so mean molecular kinetic energy, being a flame = being a certain mixture of reacting gases and solids that emit light of various wavelengths, and so on.  These claims were hard-won empirical discoveries.

	Mental state-types may be contrasted with what philosophers call mental state-tokens.  Mental state-types are repeatable, i.e., indefinitely many people can be in the same mental state-type (e.g., pain) at indefinitely many times.  But mental state-tokens, by definition, are unique, one-off occurrences.  Examples of mental state-tokens are your understanding what you are reading right now, my experiencing a dull backache for one hour from noon yesterday, and Smith’s thinking all her adult life that no planets lie outside the solar system.  A mental state-token is always a token of some mental state-type.  Indeed, a given mental state-token is always a token of more than one mental state-type.  For example, my experiencing a dull backache for one hour from noon yesterday was a token of the more specific type, experiencing a dull backache, as well as of the more general type, being in pain.  Even highly specific mental state-types are repeatable; hence they should not be confused with mental state-tokens.





	Let us call the second way in which a mental state might be so related to a material state that the former could be said to be nothing over and above the latter the realization way.  Your being in pain at time t is related to your being in material (e.g., neurophysiological) state M at t in this way if, and only if, the following three conditions are met:

 pain ≠ M,
 pain = the state of being in one of the state-types that play causal role R, and
 M is one of the state-types that play causal role R.

Such claims as that pain = the state of being in one of the state-types that plays causal role R (like such claims as that pain = M) should be understood as ones whose truth or falsity cannot in general be evaluated by a priori reflection on the meanings of the words.

	Some philosophers would wish to add a fourth condition to the three stated above:

 your being in pain at time t = your being in M at t. 

But this seems unnecessary.  Given that you are in M at t, then, given the third condition, you must be in one of the state-types that plays role R.  But in that case, given the second condition, you must be in pain at t.  Your being in pain at t is therefore nothing over and above your being in M at t.  The relation that holds in this case between your being in M at t and your being in pain at time t is what some philosophers call realization; when the three conditions are met, your being in M at t can be said to realize your being in pain at time t.  Furthermore, because the second condition implies that there is more than one state-type that plays causal role R, different pain state-tokens on different occasions might be realized, respectively, by material state-tokens that belong to different material state-types.  If different pain state-tokens on different occasions are in fact so realized, then pain can be said to be multiply realized.

	It might be wondered why the fourth condition noted above could not simply replace the second and third conditions.  But very few, if any, philosophers today take this possibility seriously.  One reason is that no one has been able to explain how it even could be the case that your being in pain at time t = your being in M at t given that (i) pain ≠ M and (ii) the second and third conditions do not hold either; it seems incoherent.

	For expository ease only, the second condition has been formulated more restrictively than it ought to be.  It says that pain is the state of being in one of the state-types that plays causal role R.  This claim comprises two sub-claims.  The first sub-claim is that pain is a so-called higher-order state-type, i.e., a state-type to be in which just is to be in one of the state-types that meets some specific condition.  The second sub-claim is that this specific condition is the playing of a particular causal role; for a state-type to play a particular causal role is for tokens of the state-type to be caused by so-and-so causes and in turn to cause such-and-such effects.  When philosophers speak of a functional state-type, they very often mean a higher-order state-type for which the defining specific condition is the playing of a certain causal role; similarly, when philosophers speak of functionalism, they very often mean the view that mental state-types are one and the same as certain functional state-types.  It is this second sub-claim, however, that makes the formulation of the second condition unduly restrictive.  It is not necessary to characterize a higher-order state-type as the state of being in one of the state-types that plays a certain causal role.  In principle, a higher-order state-type could be characterized in various other ways, e.g., as the state of being in one of the state-types that has a certain biological function, or that stands in certain non-causal relations to other states, or that is a certain stage in the implementation of a certain program.  It is the identification of pain with a higher-order state-type of some sort or other that is doing all the metaphysical work here, i.e., explaining how your being in pain at t can be nothing over and above your being in M at t, even though pain ≠ M.

	We have now seen two ways in which a mental state might be so related to a material state that the former could be said to be nothing over and above the latter.  Some readers, however, may be aware of philosophical claims to the effect that mental phenomena supervene on material phenomena.  Intuitively, the idea is that mental states supervene on material states if, and only if, any two entities that are exactly the same with regard to the material states they are in must also be exactly the same with regard to the mental states they are in—i.e., any two entities that differ mentally in any way must also differ materially in some way.  But few philosophers of mind today think that claims of supervenience provide a third way in which a mental state might be so related to a material state that the former could be said to be nothing over and above the latter.  A claim of supervenience tells us nothing about the relationship between one’s mental state at a given time and one’s material state at the same time—except that the former somehow necessitates the latter.  Now if this necessitation is a sui generis fundamental relation holding between two state-tokens of distinct state-types, it is then false that one’s mental state at t is nothing over and above one’s material state at t.  But if this necessitation relation holds because one’s mental state at t is related to one’s material state at t in one of the two ways already noted, then the claim of supervenience has contributed nothing to solving the mind-body problem.

A formulation of materialism
 
	It is now possible to formulate the thesis of materialism.  First we say what it is for a particular mental state-type, e.g., pain, to be materialistically acceptable:

Pain is materialistically acceptable if, and only if, either of the following two conditions is met:
(1) there is some material state-type, m, such that pain = m 
(2) there is some higher-order state-type, h, such that pain = h, and every state-token of h is realized by some or other state-token of some or other material state-type.





	The alternatives to materialism are, of course, the various forms of dualism.  Traditionally, philosophers have distinguished between two main forms of dualism, substance dualism and property dualism.  Substance dualism is the view that mental states-types are one and the same as certain immaterial state-types of certain immaterial substances (“substance” is the philosophical name for an entity that persists through time, capable of gaining and losing properties).  Property dualism is the view that mental states-types are one and the same as certain immaterial state-types of certain material substances, presumably brains; on this view, then, brains possess immaterial as well as material properties.  But we should acknowledge at least one more form of dualism, which we could call functionalist dualism: the view that mental states-types are one and the same as certain higher-order state-types, (some of) the state-tokens of which, however, are realized by state-tokens of some or other immaterial state-type.  Functionalist dualism has few, if any, defenders.

	We can imagine a version of property dualism on which there is no system to the way in which material entities are in mental states.  On such a view, it might be that some humans are in mental states while others—who might even be their molecule-for-molecule duplicates—are not, and it might even be that rocks are in mental states.  Were the imagined view true, mental properties (i.e., certain immaterial properties) would be more or less randomly distributed over material entities.  Actual defenders of property dualism, however, reject this imagined view, instead holding  a form of property dualism usually called emergentism.  On this view, only material systems that exhibit a certain degree and kind of (material) complexity can be in mental states, and which mental states such systems are in depends on the exact material states that they are in.  More precisely, mental states are said to emerge from certain material states in accordance with certain fundamental laws of emergence; according to such laws, whenever a material system of such-and-such a material kind enters so-and-so material state, it simultaneously enters a specific mental state.  It is important to see why such laws must be fundamental.  Because emergentists are property dualists, they must deny that emergent mental state-types are one and the same as material state-types (including those from which they emerge), or that they are one and the same as higher-order state-types whose tokens are realized by tokens of material state-types.  But in that case laws of emergence cannot be explained in terms of underlying laws of physics, since these only govern material states, and so laws of emergence must be fundamental.









	Philosophical discussion of the state of the evidence for materialism, however, has mainly focused on just two lines of empirically-based reasoning.  The first is sometimes called the causal argument, but it is more aptly called the argument from causal closure.  The argument can be formulated in several non-equivalent ways, but here is a relatively simple version.  It begins with the commonsense assumption that our intentions, or decisions, or beliefs and desires often cause those bodily motions (e.g., muscle contractions) that make up our behavior.  On this assumption, many mental states have neurophysiological events among their effects.  Presumably these mental states are not causally sufficient all by themselves for their neurophysiological effects; but they are causally sufficient for their effects in the circumstances in which they actually occur, circumstances that would be insufficient alone.  However, the great success of neurophysiology to date in explaining neurophysiological phenomena is strong evidence that the neurophysiological effects of mental events already have sufficient neurophysiological causes; that is, the realm of the neurophysiological is causally closed, meaning that to causally explain these neurophysiological effects it is in principle never required to leave this realm by invoking a non-neurophysiological cause.  It follows that the neurophysiological effects of mental states have both mental causes that are sufficient (in the circumstances) for these effects and neurophysiological causes that are sufficient for these effects.

	On the dualist view that mental states are immaterial, however, the mental cause of a given neurophysiological effect is neither a token of a mental state-type identical with some material state-type nor a token of a higher-order state-type that is realized by some or other material state-token; the mental cause is therefore entirely distinct from any neurophysiological (or other material) cause of its effect.  On the dualist view, then, the neurophysiological effects of mental states have two sufficient causes, one mental and one neurophysiological, each entirely distinct from the other; they are therefore overdetermined.

	But this conclusion is one that we should avoid if we can, for two reasons.  First, if we construe mental causes as entirely distinct from neurophysiological causes, then we sacrifice theoretical parsimony without gaining any ability to causally explain anything that otherwise could not be causally explained.  Second, consider the unfortunate victim of a firing squad whose death is causally overdetermined when he is struck by two bullets each of which was sufficient in the circumstances to kill him; in this case, the convergence of two separate causes to produce the same effect can be explained—the firing squad was deliberately organized, after all.  But if a mental cause and a neurophysiological cause converge to produce the very same neurophysiological effect, we must treat this convergence as a coincidence, and indeed, if such convergence occurs routinely, as a coincidence that occurs over and over again.





	Various responses to the argument from causal closure are open to dualists.  One response is to deny the commonsense assumption that our mental states do cause the bodily motions that make up our behavior; this requires commitment to the epiphenomenalist view that, although mental states are effects, they are never causes (at least of physical effects).  Another response is to insist that it is still an open empirical question whether the neurophysiological effects of mental events really do have sufficient neurophysiological causes.  A third response is to concede that materialism is preferable to dualism in light of the causal closure of the neurophysiological, but to claim that, because of various philosophical considerations, dualism is preferable to materialism, all things considered.  A fourth response—philosophically the most interesting—is to charge that materialism too has difficulty accommodating the fact that mental states cause neurophysiological effects, since, it is argued, if materialism is true, then the mentality of mental causes is never relevant as such to their effects.  Materialists, of course, contest this charge.

The argument from neurophysiological dependence

	Let us turn now to the second of the two main lines of empirically-based reasoning in favor of materialism that have been discussed recently in the philosophical literature.  The crucial premise in this reasoning is that in recent decades innumerable correlations between mental states and activities, on the one hand, and neurophysiological states and activities, on the other, have been discovered by the use of such techniques as fMRI.  In one version of the argument, what these empirical findings make plausible is the claim that the mental is dependent on the neurophysiological in the specific sense that, for any person you like, and for any type of mental state that person might be in or mental process that person might undergo, in order for that person to be in that type of mental state or undergo that mental process, there is neurophysiological activity of some distinctive kind that has to be going on—simultaneously—in that person’s brain.  Two points about this claim deserve emphasis.  First, the scope of the claim is not limited to some restricted class of relatively primitive or concrete mental states or activities, say, sensory states; it applies to all types of mental state or activity, including the most abstract and sophisticated, such as doing mental arithmetic or thinking that God exists.  Second, the claim is not that all types of mental state or activity depend on some single kind of simultaneous neurophysiological activity, in the way in which all types of mental state or activity depend on the functioning of the subject’s circulatory system; the claim is rather that each type of state or activity requires a different kind of simultaneous neurophysiological activity (there can be overlap, of course).

	How do materialism and dualism compare when it comes to explaining the empirically-discovered dependence of the mental on the neurophysiological?  The answer is that, while both views can be construed so as to explain it, materialism does so more parsimoniously.  Consider materialism first.  If all mental-state types are materialistically acceptable, then the dependence of the mental on the neurophysiological is precisely what one would expect to find.  For if a mental state-type is identical with a neurophysiological state-type, then obviously there cannot be a state-token of the former type without a state-token of the latter type.  And if—the only other possibility—a mental state-type is a higher-order state-type whose tokens are all realized by neurophysiological state-tokens, then there cannot be a state-token of the mental state-type without a state-token of some or other material state-type.

	Now consider dualism.  It is true that the empirically-discovered dependence of the mental on the neurophysiological does refute certain forms of dualism, e.g., those holding that, while the brain is needed for the mind to receive sensory inputs and to produce motor outputs, the mental activity that occurs in between requires nothing whatever from the brain.  But dualism could treat mental state-types as immaterial and then explain the dependence of the mental on the neurophysiological by positing that hitherto unrecognized fundamental laws of nature connect mental state-types to the neurophysiological state-types on which they depend.  

	So both materialism and dualism can be made to entail the dependence of the mental on the neurophysiological.  But—and this is a crucial methodological point—it does not follow that materialism and dualism are both equally well supported by it.  Two hypotheses may both entail a certain body of data and yet be differentially supported by it.  [Laudan cite.] A spectacular example is provided by Philip Gosse’s notorious 1857 hypothesis that God created the world rather recently, but made it appear to be millions of years old.  This hypothesis entails the very same geological data that Gosse’s contemporaries among geologists accounted for by hypothesizing that the Earth is very old, and that unimaginably slow geological processes operated to produce its modern appearance.  But no one thinks that these two hypotheses are equally credible in light of the geological data.  Indeed, for any hypothesis, scientific or everyday, that we accept on the strength of a given body of evidence we can usually dream up a rival hypothesis that entails the same body of evidence but that we reject as less credible. 
   












	Such mental states as thinking that Cleveland is north of Chicago, wanting to eat ice cream, or fearing that the car has no gas exhibit what philosophers call intentionality.  While intentions to do so-and-so (e.g., to buy milk) certainly exhibit intentionality, intentionality is not the property of being intended, and, as the examples illustrate, mental states that are not intentions can still exhibit intentionality.  The intentionality of a mental state is its being about—or directed toward—something, typically something distinct from itself, e.g., an object, stuff, or state of affairs.  But the intentionality of a mental state seems not to be just a relation between the mental state and that toward which the mental state is directed.  For one can think something that is false (Cleveland is not north of Chicago) and want what does not exist (e.g., to meet Santa Claus).  How can one stand in a relation to states of affairs or objects that do not exist?  This is why the intentionality of mental states is prima facie problematic for materialism.

	Now sentences of natural languages also exhibit intentionality, but they are clearly material.  So what is the problem?  The answer is that, according to a popular view, the intentionality of sentences is somehow derived from the intentionality of mental states; crudely, the idea is that the sentence, “Grass is green”, means that grass is green because there is a population among whom there exists a convention by which a speaker utters “Grass is green” when he or she wants to get a hearer to think that he or she thinks that grass is green.  But obviously the intentionality of mental states is not be derived in turn from that of anything else; the intentionality of mental states is original, i.e., underived.

	Materialist philosophers have proposed reductive accounts of the nature of original intentionality (see, e.g., Fodor, Dretske, and Millikan).  Such accounts aim to state individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for a state to exhibit some sort of intentionality, e.g., to represent that grass is green or to refer to dogs, where these conditions could in principle be met by a material system.  There are major differences between different accounts, they all appeal to some combination of the following kinds of ingredients: causal relations, dependence in accordance with laws of nature, co-variation, isomorphism, biologically normal conditions, and biological functions.  One crucial task that such accounts must accomplish is to allow for the occurrence of misrepresentation, as when, e.g., someone mistakenly thinks that so-and-so, and much ingenuity has been shown in trying to do so.  For example, Jerry Fodor aims to state a sufficient condition for a mental symbol S to refer to cows.  Roughly, he proposes that tokens of S refer to cows if (i) the presence of cows produces tokens of S, and (ii) if anything that is not a cow (e.g., an elk on a dark night) produces tokens of S, then (e.g.) elks would not have produced tokens of S unless cows had done so, whereas cows would still have done so even if elks had not.  From Fodor’s proposal it follows that, even if some elk in poor light causes me to think mistakenly that there is a cow over there, the mental symbol activated in my thought can still refer to cows.  The important teleological account of intentionality developed by Ruth Millikan accounts for misrepresentation in a quite different way, but it is too complex to be explained here.









	 According to it, we can imagine a super-scientist of the future, Mary, who has never actually experienced pain herself, but who has come to know everything that a completed multi-disciplinary science of pain has to say about pain.  She therefore knows all the physics and chemistry of the various kinds of stimuli that cause pain, all the neurophysiology of nociceptors, the somatosensory cortex, the anterior cingulate cortex, and the rest, and all the causal and representational properties of the pertinent neuronal events.  But Mary doesn’t know everything about pain.  For imagine that, once her studies are over, Mary stubs her toe and thus experiences pain for the first time in her life.  In doing so, she learns something: she learns what it is like to have a pain in the toe.  Therefore, since before she felt her first pain she didn’t know what it is like to have a pain in the toe, but did know everything that a completed multi-disciplinary science of pain has to say about pains in the toe, what it is like to have a pain in the toe must be a property that even a completed multi-disciplinary science of pain fails to mention.  Such a property cannot in that case be a material property, and so materialism must be false.

	The Knowledge Argument has generated a huge critical literature.  But before we turn to the most influential objection to the argument let us pause to consider the relevance of the argument to an important aspect of the phenomenology of phenomenally conscious mental states.  When one attends to one’s own phenomenally conscious mental states, it is natural to think of oneself as aware of a private realm (of colors and shapes, say)—private in the sense that not only is no other person actually aware of it but no other person even could be aware of it, no matter what he or she was able to learn about one’s behavior, one’s environment, the current condition of one’s brain, or the functional roles played by particular brain states that one is in.  That we all think of our own phenomenally conscious mental states in this way presumably explains why we never feel that we can be completely certain how the phenomenally conscious mental states of other people compare with our own, when, say, they and we are both looking at exactly the same ripe tomato.  It seems quite impossible, however, for any material (or materialistically acceptable) state to be such that only one person, even in principle, can have cognitive access to it; it seems essential to what is material (and materialistically acceptable) that it is in principle cognitively accessible to more than one person.  So if it really is true that to attend to one’s own phenomenally conscious mental states is to be aware of a private realm, it follows that phenomenally conscious mental states are not material (or materialistically acceptable).  Materialists must therefore deny that we are aware of a private realm when we attend to our own phenomenally conscious mental states, and must hold that we are in error when we think that we are.  

	But what accounts for our thinking of ourselves as aware of a private realm to which no one else can possibly have access?  A plausible answer is that, when we attend to our own phenomenally conscious mental states, we have exactly the same intuition that leads us to judge, in the Mary case, that Mary still learns something after she feels pain for the first time, despite her already knowing everything that a completed multi-disciplinary science of pain has to say about pain.  For what Mary knows about pain before she feels it for the first time is precisely the maximum that other people could know about one’s own pain; it is the most that can be known from the third-person (as opposed to first-person) point of view.  The intuition is simply that what can be known about us, even ideally, from the third-person point of view still omits something that we can each know about ourselves through introspection.  The corollary is that this something must concern a reality to which each of us alone, and no one else, has cognitive access, even in principle.  Now if this explanation of why we think of ourselves as aware of a private realm when we attend to our own phenomenally conscious mental states is correct, then a successful materialist diagnosis of where the Knowledge Argument goes wrong promises to reveal the error in our thinking of ourselves as aware of a private realm to which no one else can possibly have access.

Response to the Knowledge Argument

	The most influential materialist objection to the Knowledge Argument has been to challenge the validity of the inference from the claim that when Mary stubs her toe she learns what it is like to have a pain in the toe to the conclusion that what it is like to have a pain in the toe is a property that is not mentioned in a completed multi-disciplinary science of pain.  The inference is invalid, it is said, because Mary, in learning what it is like to have a pain in the toe, might in fact be learning, of her pain, that it has a certain material property that a completed multi-disciplinary science of pain already speaks of, albeit in the technical language of the neurosciences, and that Mary therefore already knew of.  In that case, Mary, in knowing what it is like to have a pain in the toe, would simply be mentally representing this material property in a format different from the one she used to represent it before she first stubbed her toe.

	These different representational formats might go along with differences in computational roles sufficiently large that it would be appropriate to speak of Mary’s genuinely having learned something after she stubs her toe, even though there was no new property of which she learned the existence.  Here is an analogy.  Imagine that, because of a blow to the head, I suffer terrible amnesia and forget that I am Andrew Melnyk.  But I read in the newspaper that tomorrow, for reasons that don’t matter, one Andrew Melnyk will be publicly flogged.  “Bad news for Melnyk”, I think to myself, but soon return to my quest to find out who I am.  Later, however, I discover that I am Andrew Melnyk, and then, of course, I realize, to my horror, that tomorrow I will be publicly flogged!  The point is that, when I realize that tomorrow I will be publicly flogged, I really do learn something, even though I already knew that AM will be publicly flogged, and my being flogged is the very same occurrence as AM’s being flogged, so that I do not learn of some occurrence of which I was previously unaware.

	A possible reply to this objection is that, even if the story about different formats that represent the very same property is true, it still does not explain why Mary did not already know what it is like to have a pain in the toe before she stubbed her toe.  Why could she not have used empirical methods to convince herself before stubbing her toe that what it is like to have a pain in the toe just is so-and-so material property, so that she could then use her complete knowledge of material properties to infer before stubbing her toe what having a pain in the toe is like?

	At this point, materialist objectors to the Knowledge Argument need to say more about the different way in which, after she has stubbed her toe, Mary mentally represents that material property of her pain in the toe that, according to materialism, just is what it is like to have a pain in the toe.  They do so by positing the existence of what are termed phenomenal concepts.  On this view, concepts in general are mental representations of objects, stuffs, or properties, and are the constituents of mental representations of complete states of affairs (e.g., a thing’s having a certain property).  Phenomenal concepts in particular are supposed to be the concepts that subjects use to represent their own phenomenally conscious mental states while they are actually in those states, and attending to them introspectively; the subjects might then report what they are thinking as best they can with such sentences as “My current experience is like that” or “It’s like that with me now”.  

	Now materialist objectors to the Knowledge Argument hypothesize that phenomenal concepts have a special feature that enables them to explain why Mary could not have used empirical methods to convince herself before stubbing her toe that what it is like to have a pain in the toe just is so-and-so material property.  The special feature is that a subject cannot possess (and hence use) a phenomenal concept of a given phenomenally conscious mental state unless the subject is actually in that state at the time or has at least been in that state in the past.  So, to return to Mary: if, after she has stubbed her toe, Mary thinks about her pain by using a phenomenal concept of pain, then, since this is the first pain that she has ever experienced, Mary cannot previously have possessed (and hence used) this phenomenal concept, and so she cannot previously have come to think (by empirical or any other means) that what it is like to have a pain in the toe just is so-and-so material property.  However, this appeal to phenomenal concepts is highly controversial.  Whether there can be a plausible account, consistent with materialism, of how a concept could have the special feature just described, and whether phenomenal concepts even exist, is the topic of active research.  (that volume)  
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